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Dominant Coalitions Directing Acquisitions: 
Different Decision Makers, Different Decisions 
 
Abstract 
Coalitions are important in organizational decision making, but the question of how coalitions are 
built and make decisions in response to firm performance is still not sufficiently explored. In this 
study, we develop and test theory on how potential coalitions are built through shared experience and 
recruitment of allies. When organizations respond to performance relative to aspiration levels, either 
as problemistic search following low performance or opportunity exploration following high 
performance, members form coalitions to influence decisions. We develop theory of coalition 
formation that builds on upper echelons theory and the theory of dominant coalitions to predict how 
past experience of decision makers leads to preferred actions by each member and subsequent 
coalition formation. We use this theory to make new measures of potential coalitions and apply it to 
acquisitions made by firms in China. We find evidence that the experience of members of the key 
decision making group—the board of directors—affects the potential coalition building, and hence 
the type of acquisition target, as predicted.  
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INTRODUCTION 
Two important contributions in “A Behavioral Theory of the Firm” (Cyert & March, 1963) were 
the theory of dominant coalitions and the theory of problemistic search. Problemistic search predicts 
when organizations change, while dominant coalitions predict which alternative is chosen. 
Problemistic search has received more theoretical and empirical attention and follow-up, even though 
dominant coalitions is the theory that directly examines how decisions are made. In dominant 
coalition theory, each decision can trigger building of new coalitions supporting each alternative, 
even if the reason for support could differ across members (Cyert & March, 1963: 29-32). It can also 
imply continuation of past coalitions. This differs from traditional views of organizations as stable 
formal hierarchies or informal power structures. The theory also covered interdependence among 
decisions such as individuals yielding in one decision in order to gain influence in another decision. 
The flexible view of decision making seen in this theory has struck many as realistic (Gavetti, Greve, 
Levinthal, & Ocasio, 2012), but also as difficult to turn into specific predictions, as it argues against 
the stability needed to build a research stream with clear predictions.  
Currently a close equivalent to dominant coalition theory is upper echelon theory, which 
contains research that incorporates coalition building through its focus on how managerial 
characteristics affect organizational decisions (Carpenter, Geletkanycz, & Sanders, 2004; Hambrick 
& Mason, 1984). This work uses the theory of dominant coalitions to aggregate from the experience 
of individual decision makers to a group decision, gaining predictions by adopting a more stable 
view of decision making through viewing decision-maker backgrounds and positions as giving 
relatively stable preferences (Bromiley & Rau, 2016). Its research progress has been impressive, 
and has led to many findings on how the composition of the upper echelon of organizations 
affect behaviors such as international diversification (Sambharya, 1996; Tihanyi, Ellstrand, 
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Daily, & Dalton, 2000), competitive aggression (Ferrier, 2001), and firm growth (Kor, 2003). 
Although upper echelon theory gained predictions from having fewer contingencies than the 
original dominant coalition theory, this has led to two shortcomings. The first shortcoming is that 
the building of coalitions has been viewed as relatively simple, with many studies focusing on 
average upper echelon characteristics (Carpenter et al., 2004). This implies that a group majority 
or average dominates, but dominant coalition theory specifies that coalitions could either arise 
naturally from a pre-existing majority group or be built from a minority group finding allies 
among the neutral, ambivalent, and undecided. Such political maneuvering has been missing 
from much of the subsequent work. Upper echelon theory can be extended by incorporating 
coalition building, and this extension is especially valuable if the decision-making group has 
significant variation in member preferences. 
To address this shortcoming, we draw from two theories. First, dominant coalition theory 
saw coalitions as being formed by subgroups with shared interests and grown to dominant size 
through recruitment of neutral, ambivalent, and undecided individuals who could become allies 
(Cyert & March, 1963: 29-32). This suggests that the modeling of coalition building should take 
into account both the strength of each contesting group and the potential allies they can recruit. 
This is an extension of prior research, which has looked at the proportion of decision makers of 
one specific type, such as outside directors (e.g., Wade, O'Reilly, & Chandratat, 1990). The group 
strength is determined by the number, commitment, and status of its members. Second, faultline 
theory predicts that decision-making teams with sharp divisions between subgroups will have 
more contestation and poorer decision making (Lau & Murnighan, 2005), again suggesting that 
coalition building has distinctive properties in groups with undecided members. Incorporating 
dominant coalitions and faultlines into upper echelon theory produces a more realistic and 
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flexible model of coalition building. 
The second shortcoming of upper echelons theory is that it implicitly assumes a steady 
inflow of similar decision-making opportunities. Contrary to early evidence that upper echelon 
effects depend on the performance level (Boeker, 1997), upper echelons research focuses more 
on non-contingent effects than on change induced by the organizational performance (Bromiley 
& Rau, 2016). To address this shortcoming, we draw on the theory of problemistic search (Cyert & 
March, 1963: 120-122; Greve, 1998), which posits that organizations search for solutions when 
performance below an aspiration level indicates a problem. This search is initially near the presumed 
cause of low performance, but becomes broader if satisfactory solutions cannot be found or do not 
work. This theory has led to an accumulation of studies showing that many organizational changes 
are driven by performance below the aspiration level (Gavetti et al., 2012; Greve, 2003b; Shinkle, 
2012). These changes are motivated by decision makers seeking to solve a problem of performance 
below the aspiration level. High performance also affects organizational decision making, because it 
gives opportunities to invest retained earnings, and it gives executives greater discretion through 
looser board supervision of their proposed actions (Hambrick & Finkelstein, 1987; Li & Tang, 2010; 
Tuggle, Sirmon, Reutzel, & Bierman, 2010). The influence on firm actions is particularly high when 
decision makers can claim a role in contributing to firm performance (Boeker, 1989; Hickson, 
Hinings, Lee, Schneck, & Pennings, 1971). These theories suggest that decisions are triggered by 
problem solving or opportunity pursuit, causing the upper echelon effects to be dependent on 
performance relative to aspiration levels. 
We thus have an opportunity to draw on the behavioral theory of the firm with its theory of 
coalition building and problemistic search to address these gaps in current upper echelons research. 
We combine two theoretical mechanisms: (1) decisions are triggered by comparison of performance 
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and the aspiration level; (2) when making decisions, decision-makers with similar experience attempt 
to build dominant coalitions in order to reach their favored outcome. We elaborate these mechanisms 
in the theory section with an emphasis on the second. Our main contribution is to enrich theory on 
coalition building by identifying members seeking to form a dominant coalition and accounting for 
members who can be recruited as allies. Our second contribution is to develop the concept of 
potential coalitions as a result of coalition building and construct empirical measures to assess 
potential coalitions, detect the likely dominant coalition, and predict the alternative chosen. This 
contribution allows coalition building to move from theory to concrete predictions for empirical 
research. Our third contribution is to incorporate the performance relative to aspirations as a 
condition that triggers coalition formation to make decisions on organizational change. 
We apply the theory to the decision on the type of acquisition made by the focal firm. This 
outcome connects well to our contribution because acquisitions are a strategic behavior that is 
affected both by upper echelon composition and performance relative to the aspiration level 
(Haleblian, Kim, & Rajagopalan, 2006; Iyer & Miller, 2008; Jensen & Zajac, 2004). Acquisitions are 
approved by the board of directors. We can identify the experience of each board member, infer their 
preferred solutions and likely allies, and predict the potential coalition formation and decision (Desai, 
2016; Dowell, Shackell, & Stuart, 2011; Ocasio, 1994). We study listed firms in China from 2000-
2012, after the 1980s market reforms and the 1990s growth of the stock market. Firms in our study 
have board members with various degrees of experience with market competition and state control, 
giving rich variation in the decision making group that will seek to build or retain a dominant 
coalition to determine acquisition choices. To investigate the effect on another strategic decision, we 
also examine whether firms choose to borrow from state banks. 
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THEORY 
Upper Echelon Experience Guiding Decision Making 
Coalition theory starts with the individual characteristics that affect the decision making. Cyert 
and March (1963: 122) posited that the training and experience that organizational members obtained 
in their work biased them towards repeating decisions. This has been overlooked in later theory 
construction and empirical studies in the behavioral theory of the firm, but has seen significant work 
in the upper echelon perspective (Carpenter et al., 2004; Hambrick & Mason, 1984). Managers re-
use knowledge from their past experience when making current decisions, as seen in specific effects 
such as international experience driving international diversification (Sambharya, 1996; Tihanyi et 
al., 2000), and general effects such as higher education level allowing greater innovativeness and 
diversification (Bantel & Jackson, 1989; Wiersema & Bantel, 1992) and greater heterogeneity in 
tenure and specialization providing more flexible strategic responses (Cho & Hambrick, 2006).  
Extending this argument, we posit that the experience that individual decision makers have 
obtained outside the organization, such as through education or past work, also influences their 
decisions. Experience provides ways of thinking that a decision maker can apply when solving 
problems, and even a store of past solutions that can be matched to current problems. It is particularly 
important for the board of directors, because they are supposed to bring their outside experience to 
bear when the organization makes important decisions (Baysinger & Hoskisson, 1990; Westphal & 
Fredrickson, 2001). There is abundant evidence that experience drawn from other board 
memberships influence board decision making (e.g., Davis & Greve, 1997; Haunschild, 1993; 
Tuschke, Sanders, & Hernandez, 2014).  
Upper echelons theory contains mechanisms that link experience and organizational outcomes. 
Prime among them are behavioral propensities to repeat familiar actions, cognitive propensities to 
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categorize and consider problems in familiar ways, and human capital to assess consequences of 
familiar actions with greater confidence (Carpenter et al., 2004: 760). There is evidence supporting 
these mechanisms also outside upper echelons. Repetition of familiar actions has been studied in 
work on organizational momentum, or the repetition of recent strategic initiatives (Amburgey, Kelly, 
& Barnett, 1993; Amburgey & Miner, 1992). Cognitive propensities are a source of firm failure to 
change following technological or regulatory changes (Audia, Locke, & Smith, 2000; Cho & 
Hambrick, 2006). Human capital effects are seen through the skill transfer in decisions such as 
acquisition premium determination (Beckman & Haunschild, 2002; Zhu, 2013). Each of these 
mechanisms is based on decision makers having a greater liking for decisions that match their 
experience, and imply that decision makers will be affected by their experience. 
Coalition Building 
Upper echelons theory sees organizational actions as reflecting the top decision makers of the 
organization (Hambrick & Mason, 1984). The behavioral theory of the firm, however, emphasizes 
the dominant coalition, which can be a subgroup of these. To integrate the two theories, we develop a 
theory that starts with individual decision maker experience and ends with coalition building to reach 
a decision. In past work, a common mechanism is that a majority rule is applied in group decisions, 
as the views that are most frequent in a decision making group will dominate the discussion, often 
leading to suppression of alternative views (Bazerman, Giuliano, & Appelman, 1984; Greve & 
Zhang, 2017; Peterson, Owens, Tetlock, Fan, & Martorana, 1998). Decision makers holding the most 
prevalent  experience will favor decisions that are proximate to their behavioral propensities, and will 
seek to determine firm actions through consensus, compromise, or contestation (Cyert & March, 
1963; Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978).  
While members of each subgroup can be counted based on their attachment to each alternative 
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view, coalition building is more complex than the simple majority rule. The strength of a coalition is 
jointly determined by the number of members, their commitment, and their status within the board. 
Commitment to a view can derive from depth of experience, as when a Chinese board member has 
greater commitment to US business practices when having both education and work experience from 
the US, as opposed to just one (Chung & Luo, 2013). Status can derive from many characteristics 
including past success (Reschke, Azoulay, & Stuart, 2017). Higher status gives greater influence on 
decisions in groups generally (Berger, Rosenholtz, & Zelditch, 1980; Ridgeway, Johnson, & 
Diekema, 1994) and specifically in boards of directors (e.g., Belliveau, O'Reilly, & Wade, 1996; 
Zald, 1969).   
Equally important, each decision has a distinct set of alternatives, so a stable preference or 
dominant coalition may not exist across decisions. Instead, each alternative is judged on its costs and 
benefits, and decision makers seek to build and retain coalitions to influence the decision. The 
coalition building involves the steps of assembling a subgroup with shared experience and recruiting 
additional members to build sufficient strength to determine the decision. While the actual coalition 
in each case is uncertain, potential coalitions can be predicted by examining the size of subgroups 
with shared experience that are likely to engage in coalition building, as well as the size of subgroups 
that are not already committed, and hence can be recruited to coalitions.  
The complexity of coalition building leaves researchers with two steps to obtain a rigorous 
prediction on the direction of change. First, the experience of each member can be examined for their 
likely preferred actions (Bertrand & Schoar, 2003; Jensen & Zajac, 2004). Second, the composition 
of the decision-making group can be assessed to estimate the strength of the potential coalition that 
can be formed in favor of each alternative. The second step implies examining the decision-making 
group to identify subgroups that favor each alternative strongly, as well as individuals who are not 
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strongly aligned with each subgroup, or who are aligned with both, and to see these neutral and 
ambivalent individuals as potential allies of the coalition that each subgroup seeks to form (Cyert & 
March, 1963). The second step has been mostly omitted in previous research, which instead only 
examines the proportion of decision-makers likely to favor a specific action (e.g., Finkelstein, 1992; 
Jensen & Zajac, 2004). For example, many studies have used the proportion of inside or outside 
directors as indicators of opposing views of firm governance (e.g., Joseph, Ocasio, & McDonnell, 
2014; Shen & Cannella, 2002; Wade et al., 1990). Coalitions need to be built and retained through 
recognition of common interest and rallying around it, however, and the dualistic approach of 
dividing boards into groups assumed to be for or against a specific option is insufficient to handle the 
distribution of experience across board members. 
The recruitment of allies is important because coalition building and retention has the three main 
components of subgroup cohesion, outgroup cooptation, and full-group confrontation (Eisenhardt & 
Bourgeois, 1988; Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). First, each subgroup maintains contact through network 
ties or in meetings, which is sometimes done covertly. Second, members of each subgroup seek to 
coopt individuals with undetermined allegiance through direct interaction, often in contest with 
members of the opposing subgroup. The members most committed to the group view are particularly 
active in cooptation efforts. Finally, the formal decision-making occasion becomes an arena for 
persuasion, with the aim of providing an appearance of consensus despite the different views. Often 
the end result is a consensus with qualifications (Eisenhardt & Bourgeois, 1988), with some members 
agreeing with a specific decision despite continued disagreement with the underlying principles.  
Although the components of this process are well known, it is worth considering how it 
influences decisions. First, numerically stronger subgroups have an advantage in the final decision. 
Second, the importance of cooptation is well understood by executives and board members, and will 
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lead to significant pre-meeting influence attempts that are likely to let undecided individuals assess 
the power of each subgroup and the costs and benefits of complying with it. Because coalition 
building and retention is an ongoing activity in organizations, each individual will consider whether 
opposing a strong subgroup in a specific decision will make it harder to exert influence in future 
decisions. This gives an advantage to a stronger subgroup in the cooptation stage. The advantage is 
greater when there are fewer unaligned members, making cooptation efforts easier to focus. The final 
decision is thus more likely to conform to the strongest subgroup, but this prediction is less certain 
when the decision-making group has more unaligned members that need to be influenced. Third, 
groups in which the members have multiple characteristics relevant to a decision and each can have 
none, one, or more characteristics may be divided cleanly into subgroups with well-defined 
faultlines, or there could be overlaps among the potential subgroups. This affects the internal group 
tension and subgroup formation, and has been the subject of significant research on the formation of 
faultlines and their effects on group conflict and decision making (e.g, Lau & Murnighan, 2005; Li & 
Hambrick, 2005; Meyer & Glenz, 2013). 
This process of building and retaining coalitions means that shared experience helps predict 
group decisions, as it identifies which subgroups of members are potential coalitions. In addition, 
member affiliation with each subgroup can have varying commitment, and this can also help predict 
potential coalitions. Finally, the status of each member can vary, and thus shape the influence when 
building coalitions. Thus, the theory should identify the commitment to each experience by each 
member, the cohesion of the subgroups of members holding the same experience, and the member 
status. Based on these ideas, we develop new measures using factor analysis and a faultline measure 
that are presented in the methodology section, and we compare the findings of analyses using these 
measures. 
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Performance Triggering Decision Tasks 
The upper echelons perspective has so far had limited consideration of the different triggers 
of decision tasks addressed by the decision-making group. This is an important gap because 
application of decision-maker experience depends on the purpose of the decision. The behavioral 
theory of the firm, on the other hand, specified that performance below an aspiration level on an 
organizational goal triggers problemistic search (Cyert & March, 1963), which is oriented toward 
solving the problem of low performance and continues until decision-makers are satisfied with a 
proposed solution. This theory of low performance leading to organizational change has been 
supported for a wide range of outcomes such as product introduction (Gaba & Joseph, 2013), 
innovations (Greve, 2003a), market expansion (Barreto, 2012), alliance partner choice (Shipilov, Li, 
& Greve, 2011), mergers and acquisitions (Iyer & Miller, 2008), divestiture (Desai, 2016), and risk 
taking (Kacperczyk, Beckman, & Moliterno, 2015). These outcomes have in common that a problem 
identified through low performance is followed by a choice of change action.  
While low performance pressures firms to find a new direction, theoretical and empirical work 
has found that high performance leads to increased managerial discretion (Hambrick & Finkelstein, 
1987; Tuggle et al., 2010) and provides the firm with slack resources that can be used to explore new 
opportunities (Tyler & Caner, 2016; Voss, Sirdeshmukh, & Voss, 2008). Exploration of new 
opportunities also triggers decision making because it implies choices among alternative actions and 
allocation of slack resources. Hence, high performance triggers decision making for the purpose of 
pursuing opportunities, and will be followed by coalition building to influence the choices of 
alternative actions. Although performance below and above the aspiration level triggers different 
decision-making occasions, each involves coalition building, either to solve a problem or pursue an 
opportunity, because decision makers will disagree on what actions are the best responses to each 
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occasion. 
In order to test this model of organizational change as a result of board experience and potential 
coalitions, we need to specify what kind of experience influences judgments of which actions are 
proximate to the decision-maker experience, and how the experience of individual decision makers, 
along with their commitment and status, aggregates up to a potential dominant coalition. This is a 
question that should be related to the empirical context and concrete differences among decision 
makers (Meindl, Stubbart, & Porac, 1994). To do so, we introduce our empirical context, the 
acquisition decisions by firms during the transition to a market economy in China. This context and 
outcome are appealing because the market transition gave the board responsibility for highly 
consequential decisions that were contentious because of the coexistence and divergence between 
market and state experience in boards, which in turn motivated coalition building, making it a sharp 
test of our theory. 
BOARD EXPERIENCE IN CHINA 
China instituted market reforms that moved from state socialism with state control of the 
economy to market capitalism with markets and profit-seeking corporations (Nee, 1992). One of the 
principal market reforms was partially privatizing state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and allowing entry 
of firms with no state ownership, giving many firms the goals of private enterprises (Chen, Firth, 
Gao, & Rui, 2006). Year 2000 to year 2012 was widely regarded as a new stage in the development 
of the listed firms in China when the private sector became an integral part of the socialist economy 
(Jiang, Yue, & Zhao, 2009), and is the time of our study. The formal structure and actual governance 
of the boards of Chinese listed firms were modeled on those in the USA through a series of 
governance reforms. Boards in Chinese firms are elected by the shareholders. The 2001 governance 
reform called for independent directors to take at least one-third of the board and to oversee many 
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specific decisions (such as director nominations) before treatment by the full board. From 2002 
boards are encouraged to adopt the same committee system as boards of US listed firms. Even the 
size is similar: boards in our data have an average of 9.9 directors, as compared to the average of 10.8 
in the current S&P 500.  
The boards still have characteristics that are distinctly Chinese. The state retained ownership in 
many firms. Firms both with and without state ownership often have directors with experience 
working for state agencies. Firms also have directors with training and experience in a market 
economy. Both types of directors are valued for their knowledge, as firms need to handle state 
relations and to operate in the market economy created by the reform (Zhang & Greve, 
Forthcoming). Acting in its capacity as the controlling shareholder, the state selected directors of 
SOEs, and most SOEs had both directors with market experience and directors with state experience 
in order to facilitate the market reform while safeguarding state interests.  
Listed firms had a variety of board compositions, and hence decision-maker experience and 
knowledge. The composition within each firm also changed over time as the market reform 
deepened, and for firm specific reasons. These firms faced variable performance, and hence 
formation of dominant coalitions to solve problems or pursue opportunities. We examine acquisition 
decisions as major actions to obtain external resources and permit the firm to engage in growth to 
improve the performance. Acquisitions are governed by the board of directors, so we have direct 
correspondence between the decision makers and organizational action we study. 
State Experience 
In state socialism, firms are seen as an actor in a redistributive economy that channels goods or 
services to the state, and in turn receives resources from the state (Szelenyi, 1978). Firms are not 
supposed to interact with the market or earn profits, instead they function as cost centers and 
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redistributive agencies that respond to central decisions through a hierarchy of government control at 
the local, provincial, regional and national levels. Firms organize the production in their industry and 
maintain balanced and stable demand and supply. In listed firms in China, directors who have 
experience working or are still working for state agencies are quite common. The state socialism 
experience makes them familiar with the actions of seeking state opinion and state help (Zhang & 
Greve, Forthcoming; Zhou, Tse, & Li, 2006), and they are able to estimate the benefits of these 
actions with confidence.  
When comparison of performance and an aspiration level signals a problem or an opportunity, 
directors with state experience will recall state intervention and favor seeking as familiar alternatives. 
Even when additional assets are needed for the firm, they prefer familiar actions such as loans from 
state-owned banks, internal acquisition, or a state-bridged acquisition.1 Market oriented M&As, on 
the other hand, require active search on the equity market, which is an unfamiliar context and set of 
actions for directors with state experience. Also, the post-M&A integration can imply seeking 
efficiency through labor force reductions, which goes against the state goal of labor market stability 
(Boubakri, Cosset, & Saffar, 2008). It is also problematic for them because it involves internal power 
changes, as the financial and managerial expertise required for post-M&A integration gives directors 
with market economy experience more intra-organizational power (Bunderson, 2003; Hickson et al., 
1971). As a result, searching on the market for M&A targets is a distant approach for state directors 
when performance feedback indicates a problem or an opportunity. Seeking state advice and support 
through relying on the state to bridge an M&A is the more proximate choice, and consolidating 
through making an internal acquisition is even more proximate.  
                                                        
1 We give exact definitions later, but state-bridged acquisitions are initiated by the state, while internal acquisitions 
among firms with shared ownership. 
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Market Experience 
In market capitalism, firms are independent profit-seeking entities that strive for economic 
efficiency through market exchange and competition, and their value is determined by the cash flow 
provided to shareholders (Fligstein, 1990). The firm has significant autonomy because it is based on 
the principles of private ownership and property rights, which are valued and protected, and thus it is 
not linked with the state except through the effects of regulation. In most listed firms in China, the 
boards include directors who are familiar with markets through their education and experience, and 
are influenced by this experience. They see themselves as part of an established corporate 
governance and management system that preserves shareholder rights and ensures that these rights 
take priority over those of all other stakeholders (Davis & Stout, 1992).  
Directors with market-related work experience and education are familiar with evaluating 
opportunities in the market and taking risk in order to increase firm value. Therefore, when 
comparison of performance and an aspiration level indicates a problem or an opportunity, they are 
willing to search for acquisitions in the equity market. Indeed, searching for acquisition targets is 
natural given the frequent use of M&As by firms in market economies (Haleblian et al., 2006; Iyer & 
Miller, 2008). Acquisitions are proximate strategic actions that firms employ to overcome 
performance problems or growth constraints, and directors with market experience assess the 
consequences more confidently than directors lacking such experience. Conversely, directors with 
market experience are less familiar with the state-related actions of internal acquisitions or state-
bridged acquisitions, and they are less confident in assessing their consequences. Most boards have 
directors with state experience, so directors with market experience have access to knowledge on 
how state-related actions can be done, but they lack personal experience that gives confidence in 
applying them, and their experience does not suggest that such actions are effective. In addition, 
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market experience does not provide network ties to the state that can facilitate state-related actions, so 
the lower familiarity is overlaid with lower capability to execute such actions. 
Firm Acquisitions  
In the early stage of the privatization process and stock market in China, many internal 
acquisitions happened among firms with shared ownership. The state encouraged these, aiming to 
dispose of bad assets, write off debt, and aggregate resources to prepare for privatization. Gradually, 
in addition to internal acquisitions, state-bridged external acquisitions were done to solve financial or 
operational problems of firms, maintain employment levels, restructure the acquired firms, and 
integrate them into the acquiring firm. The state typically picked acquirer and the target and 
facilitated the acquisition. Directors with state experiences were familiar with internal acquisitions 
and state-bridged acquisitions as a tool for the state and as a way to solve firm problems. Both of 
these types continued during our study period, and they remained familiar choices for directors with 
experience working with the state.  
SOEs and partially privatized SOEs became more market-oriented following the 2002 
enactment of the Securities Law that formalized the issuance, listing, and trading of securities and 
ensured the efficiency of equity transactions. In addition, a growing population of private firms with 
no state origin emerged on the stock market. All firm categories increasingly engaged in market-
oriented acquisitions, defined as M&As initiated by the firm. In market-oriented acquisitions, targets 
were no longer proposed by the state, instead they were chosen as potentially providing long-term 
financial returns or growth opportunities to the acquiring firms. This is the same as M&As in market 
economies, and was a familiar option for directors with education or experience from such contexts. 
We examine three main types of acquisition target: internal acquisitions of firms with shared 
ownership; state-bridged acquisition in which the external target is introduced and advised by the 
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state; and market-oriented acquisitions, which is the typical M&A in market economy. They follow 
the order from the least market-oriented to the most.   
Among market-oriented acquisitions, we further distinguish the nature of acquisitions by asset 
only, minority equity ownership, and majority equity control. The market orientation is lowest for 
asset acquisitions, which involved less managerial effort to integrate into the acquiring firm, and less 
risk. The middle is minority ownership (less than 50 percent of shares), which became more common 
over time. It is qualitatively different because it requires consideration of the current equity value and 
its future potential, and greater risk. The highest market orientation is majority ownership (50 percent 
or more), which can lead to full integration of the firms. Greater market orientation implies greater 
financial risk and integration cost, which the state experience directors are unfamiliar with. For 
directors with market experience, these are a familiar form of investments with high but uncertain 
returns, and hence not something to avoid if the decision makers assess the target as sufficiently 
promising.   
State Bank Loans 
To investigate whether the same factors influence an alternative strategic decision, we also 
examine whether firms choose to borrow from state banks to solve problems or pursue opportunities. 
In China, the state-owned banks have policy objectives, though they also seek to make commercially 
viable loans (Firth, Lin, & Wong, 2008). Accordingly, we can use loans from state-owned banks as 
an indicator of the firm choosing state-related actions. Directors with state experience know that 
state-owned banks can act as a buffer for firms that are seeking to solve problems, because this was 
the role of state bank financing especially before the market transition, even though they also give 
market-oriented loans after the market transition. Conversely, directors with market experience are 
less familiar with the potential use of favors from state banks. 
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HYPOTHESES 
Because our theory is premised on the dominant coalition making decisions that are triggered by 
organizational performance relative to aspiration levels (Greve, 1998; Hambrick & Mason, 1984), it 
assumes that performance deviations from an aspiration level leads to coalition building in order to 
shape the response. Hence, the hypotheses are interaction effects of the dominant coalition and the 
performance level. This distinguishes them from hypotheses based on upper echelons theory, which 
do not consider the performance level jointly with the formation of the dominant coalition. It 
distinguishes them from hypotheses based on performance feedback theory, which do not consider 
the composition of the decision-making group. We examine coalition building through the choice of 
acquisition target made by the firm, contingent on it making an acquisition. We rank internal 
acquisitions, state-bridged acquisitions, and market-oriented acquisitions as increasingly market-
oriented and predict more market-oriented responses to performance feedback if the board builds 
stronger coalitions around directors with market experience than state experience.  
Members of decision-making groups will apply their experience to the judgment of which 
alternative action is the best match to the problem or opportunity, leading to potential conflict 
between subgroups with different kinds of experience. The coalition-based solution to such conflicts 
is that the subgroup best positioned to muster its own members and allies is able to select alternatives 
that are proximate to its experience. Directors with market experience will advocate market oriented 
solutions to performance problems and growth constraints because they have greater familiarity and 
confidence in them (Haleblian et al., 2006; Iyer & Miller, 2008). Conversely, directors with state 
experience are reluctant to select market oriented actions, and will instead favor state-related 
solutions. In our context, these subgroups are the likely coalition builders, but boards also have 
directors whose allegiance is undetermined because they have neither kind of experience or both. 
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The decision depends on the size of each subgroup and its coalition building actions. 
Our interest is in whether the potential state or market coalition is stronger, so we can model the 
relative strength of either one. We model the potential state coalition and build hypotheses on its 
effects. To account for its numeric strength and commitment, we subdivide the board as follows: (1) 
Board members with two types of state experience, resulting in higher commitment to state solutions 
than (2) board members with just one type of state experience. (3) Board members with both state 
and market experience, making them weaker parts of the state coalition building than members with 
only state experience. (4) Directors with only market experience are adversaries. (5) Directors having 
neither kind of experience are unaligned and can become potential allies through cooptation.  
Recruitment of allies is a part of the coalition building process and is contingent on specific 
features of the decision-making group and the decision. In decision-making groups that meet 
occasionally, such as boards of directors, interpersonal ties gained from prior shared affiliation, 
experience, and interest can be used to retain existing coalitions and recruit new members. 
Interpersonal ties often overlap with similar knowledge and views, so they are more useful for 
reinforcement than for recruitment. Specific characteristics of the alternatives being considered in a 
decision can also shape the recruitment of allies. For example, the perceived attractiveness of each 
firm considered for acquisition matters because state coalition members may not back a state-related 
acquisition if the target firm looks weak. Strong support of an alternative that later underperforms 
undermine the credibility of a director. Another example is that a director may have relations to 
alternatives that overturn the general orientation. If a director with no experience or with market 
experience only considers a proposed state-directed acquisition to rescue a firm from his or her home 
town, state-experience directors or local politicians may be able to persuade the director to support it. 
Such factors specific to each decision mean that the board composition alone does not determine the 
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decision. Each decision will differ, but we expect that the potential coalition shapes overall board 
responses strongly enough for the following hypothesis to hold: 
Hypothesis 1: When performance compared with aspiration level triggers organizational change, a 
board with a stronger potential state coalition is less likely to choose market-oriented actions. 
The converse reasoning can be used to argue that the potential state coalition will be more likely 
to select actions that appeal more to its members. The problem with making this hypothesis is that 
problemistic search in response to profitability is in itself an action associated with the market 
coalition rather than the state coalition. Thus, a realistic null hypothesis is that boards with a strong 
potential state coalition will lead to the firm not searching at all, because profitability is an 
insufficiently important goal. We can keep this null hypothesis in mind, but note that it makes a 
clearer prediction on the rate of searching than the choice of action, while the state coalition 
preference for specific state-related solutions will still be reflected in the actions taken, if the firm has 
any response to performance. The prediction is: 
Hypothesis 2: When performance compared with aspiration level triggers organizational change, a 
board with a stronger potential state coalition is more likely to choose state-related actions. 
Both hypotheses state that the sensitivity to performance relative to aspiration levels is greater 
for the type of action that best matches the strongest potential coalition in a board, either market or 
state. They are based on the logic that the decision maker experience and coalition building leads to 
decisions that match the experience of the potential coalition. While our main test of the theory is the 
extent to which firms choose market-oriented acquisition targets, we also have an additional 
empirical test through loans from state bank, an action preferred by the state coalition.  
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DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
Data Sources 
The first data source is the China Stock Market and Accounting Research (CSMAR) database, 
which covers the ownership, board, and financial data of all listed firms in China to date since 1992 
(Li, Moshirian, Nguyen, & Tan, 2007; Lin & Su, 2008; Rousseau & Xiao, 2008). The second is the 
WIND database, which provides detailed information on firm M&As and loans, and has M&A date 
of announcement, type of acquisition, and nature of the acquisition. Some of the acquisitions were 
legally defined as mergers, but the data allow us to identify those with a clear acquiring and acquired 
partner. Thus, all events only occur once in the data. For loans, WIND has data on the lender and the 
stated purpose of the loans. We merged the WIND database with one-year lagged CSMAR 
ownership data, board data and fiscal year performance data. The dataset covered every M&A and 
loan application between 2000 and 2012 by all Chinese listed firms.  
Dependent Variables 
Type of acquisition. We estimate the choice of what target to acquire among the options of 
internal, state-bridged, and market-oriented acquisitions. Each acquisition target can be categorized 
by how distant it is from the usual state versus market actions, and hence what type of board member 
would see it as a more proximate option of change. For a state experience director, the closest type is 
(1) internal acquisitions, which is movement of assets or equity between firms with at least one 
common shareholder, similar to how firm assets were reorganized under state socialism by 
transferring them from one unit to the other. The middle is (2) state-bridged acquisitions, which are 
like M&As by two independent firms, but with the acquiring and target firm picked and facilitated by 
the state. The most distant is (3) market-oriented acquisitions, which are initiated because the target is 
seen as an opportunity for growth and value creation by the acquiring firm. These involve scouting 
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targets on the market, evaluating them using financial metrics, and taking risks in the acquisition 
decision. Accordingly, Type of acquisition is zero for an internal acquisition, one for a state-bridged 
acquisition, and two for a market-oriented acquisition. 
Nature of acquisition. We further analyzed the nature of market-oriented acquisitions by 
distinguishing asset-transactions, minority share acquisitions, and majority control acquisitions. We 
rank them by level of market orientation, so Nature of acquisition is zero for acquisition of assets 
without any equity stake, one for acquisition of minority equity, and two for acquisition of a 
controlling equity stake. This outcome takes the analysis one step further by distinguishing the level 
of market orientation among acquisitions that are already of the most market oriented type, making it 
a stringent test of the theory. 
We analyze these choices as an ordered logit in which higher values mean greater distance from 
state related actions. Table 1 shows a cross-tabulation of type of acquisition and nature of acquisition 
for all 31,442 acquisitions of equity or assets in the data. All analyses have repeated observations of 
the same firm, so we use robust standard errors with clustering on the firm.  
=== Insert Table 1 about here === 
State-bank loan. The variable for state-bank loan takes the value of 1 when the loan is taken 
from a state-owned bank or a policy bank,2 and 0 for loans taken from a commercial bank, either 
Chinese or foreign. It is thus a measure of the selection of source of loan, not of whether or not a loan 
is taken, and hence it is equivalent to the acquisition target measures. We analyze only loans of size 
exceeding of 1 percent of firm assets to avoid including minor loans in the analysis.  
Independent Variables 
                                                        
2 A normal state-owned bank is a commercial bank owned by the state. A policy bank has state policy objectives in 
addition to state ownership. 
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To test the hypotheses, we first calculated the proportion of board members with market or state 
experience. From the CSMAR database we had complete data on the resumes of each director, 
including a wide range of information that could be used to make indicators of director training and 
experience. Given our emphasis on market experience versus state experience we narrowed the 
information down to four indicators. For market experience, we calculate the proportion of board 
members owning shares in the company or having education or work experience in an Anglo-Saxon 
nation. Board members owning shares are (literally) invested in the market economy, and hence view 
it with greater interest. This produces greater attention and experience tracking market economy 
outcomes and seeking to understand market economy actions and outcomes. For state experience, we 
calculate the proportion of board members with work experience in a state agency or in a state-
owned bank. These variables serve as indicators of experience and comfort with the market and the 
state, respectively, and are used as components of the measure on coalition formation. 
Potential State Coalition. To test Hypothesis 1 on coalition formation, we made three measures 
of the potential state coalition. Two are new measurement approaches that match our emphasis on 
coalition building as a process involving groups that recruit allies to reach their favored decision, 
while the third is a heuristic measure that acts as a robustness test. The first measure was made by 
conducting a principal factor analysis of all boards using the proportions of board members with two 
sources of state experience, one source of state experience, both state and market experience, and 
market experience. The factor analysis efficiently combines the information in these proportions 
because they are correlated (they sum to unity), and the correlation reflects the extent to which state 
experience is replaced by the adversarial market experience or the neutral no-experience or both-
experience categories. So far the measure captures the strength of the coalition through the number 
and commitment of directors. To also take into account board member status, we weighted each 
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board member linearly by age, setting the zero point to the youngest board member age. Age 
weighting is consistent with decision-making in Confucian societies and was the best fit when 
compared with a board tenure weight and a composite weight of central state experience, party 
membership, above-average age, and above-average tenure. The findings are shown in Table 2. The 
first factor has positive loading of two and one sources of state experience and both experiences, and 
negative loading of market experience, and shows that boards can be ordered by their potential for 
forming a coalition of members with state experience. We use this factor as a stateness factor 
coalition variable.  
=== Insert Table 2 about here === 
The second measure was based on faultline theory (Meyer & Glenz, 2013; Meyer, Glenz, 
Antino, Rico, & González-Romá, 2014). Market and state experience were defined as binary 
characteristics that a board member could have either none, one, or both of, and the board was 
reduced to two groups using the Average Silhouette Weight (ASW) procedure, which has the best 
properties of the faultline measures (Meyer & Glenz, 2013). The largest of these groups, which 
always had a majority of members with either state, market, or no experience, was selected as the 
dominant coalition, and the stateness ASW was defined as the proportion of board members in this 
group multiplied with their average state experience (set to -1 for members with market experience 
and zero for members with both experiences).  
The third measure heuristically assigned a stateness proportion equal to 1 when the board had 
more than half members with only state experience, equal to 0.5 when the board had more members 
with state-only than market-only and a sum of state-only and neutral (both or none) experience 
members exceeding p, and conversely the value -1 for majority market experience and 0.5 for 
market-only exceeding state-only and the proportion of market-only and neutral exceeding p. The 
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remaining were assigned the value zero. We display tables with p set conservatively to the high value 
of 0.75, but also tried p as low as 0.6, obtaining similar findings. This measure is heuristic and only 
accounts for member proportions, ignoring commitment and status, but its simplicity makes it a good 
robustness check. 
These measures have different interpretation. The stateness factor takes into account the entire 
board composition, and thus indicates a compromise between groups with the dominant coalition 
having greater influence. The stateness ASW measures dominant coalition preference only, and 
multiplies it with the proportion of the board that belongs to the dominant coalition to take into 
account that a smaller dominant coalition may choose a less extreme decision. The stateness 
proportion is a heuristic measure of the strength of the state coalition, and also assumes dominance. 
Following performance feedback research (Greve, 1998), we calculate the performance as return 
on assets (ROA), and subtract a historical aspiration level as the weighted average of the past 
performance with most of the weight (0.9) assigned to the most recent ROA (historical aspiration 
level), or as a social aspiration level as the average ROA of all other firms in the same industry, as 
defined by the three-digit industry code. The historical aspiration level weight was chosen by 
comparing all weights in intervals of 0.1 and choosing the one with best fit to the data. Each 
performance relative to the aspiration level is divided into performance above and below each 
aspiration level and interacted with the variables indicating board member experience.  
Control variables. We controlled for the age of the firm in case it affects the market orientation 
of its acquisitions. We controlled for firm size by taking the logarithm of the firm’s total assets. We 
also considered the impact of a firm’s growth opportunities on acquisitions, using the market-to-book 
ratio. We included the debt-to-equity ratio to capture the potential impact of a firm’s financial 
leverage on acquisition decisions, and captured prior acquisition experience as the cumulative 
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number of acquisitions of assets only, a minority stake, and a controlling stake of equity. We enter 
these three because correlation among the cumulative acquisition variables is too high to allow entry 
of more, and preliminary analysis showed that state-bridged acquisitions had the lowest explanatory 
power. We enter the percentage of free cash flow to control for the inefficient investments that firms 
may make when holding excess resources. We also included the diversification level of a firm, 
operationalized as the count of industries a firm engages in. Descriptive statistics and correlations are 
shown in Table 3, which shows that all the correlations are low to moderate except the alternative 
stateness variables, which are highly correlated as they should be. 
=== Insert Table 3 about here === 
Methodology 
The choice of what target to acquire can be modeled as an event history analysis with competing 
risks in which each of the targets has a separate regression function, or as a sequential model with the 
first step being an event history analysis of the rate of making acquisitions, and the second being a 
choice analysis of the target chosen. These approaches are statistically related (Hachen, 1988), but 
the sequential model best captures dependencies among the alternatives such as the ranking of 
market to state proximity. Thus, we choose the sequential model, estimating an event history model 
of the acquisition rate and forming an inverse Mills ratio to control for selectivity (Heckman, 1979), 
which is entered as a control variable in an ordered logit model of the target choice. When a firm 
makes multiple acquisitions in a day, these are assigned the same Mills ratio. This modeling approach 
means that the findings indicate choices rather than rates of change. We use the same sample of firms 
and acquisitions as in our earlier paper examining how institutional logics and board composition 
affected the rate of making acquisitions (Greve & Zhang, 2017). The hazard rate model reported in 
Table 2, Model 7 (Greve & Zhang, 2017: 685) is used to form the Mills ratio.  
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We show findings from an ordinary ordered logit, which assumes proportional odds and 
estimates one set of coefficients across outcome levels, but we also estimated a general ordered logit 
which estimates separate coefficients, finding that this model produces equivalent findings for the 
type of acquisitions but stronger support of the hypotheses for the nature of acquisitions. We show 
models both with and without year fixed effects because average stateness decreased over time, so 
just as models without year effects have unmeasured effects of annual events, models with year 
effects may attribute some stateness effects to the year fixed effect. The correct estimate is likely to 
be intermediate of these models. 
RESULTS 
Table 4 shows the ordered logit model of acquisition target type. The main effects of 
performance indicate that market-oriented acquisitions are more likely to be chosen when the 
performance is high relative to the historical aspiration level, but less as it is high relative to the social 
aspiration level. Thus, performance improvements produce the confidence to choose more market-
oriented acquisitions, whereas higher performance than other firms induces caution. In Models 2 
through 7, the interactions with the board stateness measures show support for Hypothesis 1 for 
performance above the historical aspiration level both without and with year fixed effects, as every 
coefficient estimate of the interactions shows that a stronger state coalition weakens the effect of 
performance on the choice of market-oriented acquisitions. Hypothesis 1 has full support above the 
social aspiration level without year fixed effects, but partial loss of significance with year fixed 
effects. Below the aspiration levels, there are significant coefficient estimates without fixed effects, 
but the significance is lost when the year fixed effects are entered.  
Figure 1 graphs the estimated effect of the best-fitting Model 5, for firms that have low, average, 
and high stateness. The graphs display the predicted probability of the most market-oriented 
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outcome, and show a shift toward market acquisition when performance is above historical aspiration 
levels. For low-stateness boards the increase is from 50% to 75% probability of a market acquisition. 
Decisions shift away from a market acquisition when performance is above social aspiration levels, 
and for low-stateness boards the probability drops from 50% to 34%. The shift is smaller for average 
stateness boards, but is still statistically significant.3 For low stateness the curves are level, and the 
slopes are not significantly different from zero. The stateness ASW measure gives similar graphs.  
=== Insert Table 4 and Figure 1 about here === 
The findings show that the effects of board composition are stronger above the aspiration level, 
as one would expect from the greater board discretion when the firm has high performance 
(Hambrick & Finkelstein, 1987). This finding is consistent with the upper echelons perspective. The 
findings below the aspiration levels are weak for firms with high or average stateness, whereas they 
are strong above the aspiration level for firms with average or low stateness. Although this study is 
unique in examining the content rather than rate of change, this finding is consistent with past studies 
showing that strategic changes are highly likely when performance is below the aspiration level, but 
do not become more likely as the performance declines further below the aspiration level, while the 
likelihood of changes declines steadily as performance increases above the aspiration level (e.g., 
Greve, 1998, 2003a; Miller & Chen, 2004). The graphs show that the responsiveness to the 
performance level is greatly reduced when the board has high stateness, as predicted. 
Table 5 shows the analysis of the acquisition nature for the market-oriented acquisitions. This 
analysis thus examines a subset of acquisitions that already are highly market-oriented. It supports 
Hypothesis 1 above the historical aspiration level without fixed effects for the year, and these 
coefficient estimates remain significant in the fixed-effect model using the faultline measure (which 
                                                        
3 The test uses the Stata test statement with the stateness of the interaction variable set to the same value as in each 
curve. 
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has best fit to the data) and the proportion measure. Hypothesis 1 has full support above the social 
aspiration level with and without year fixed effects. Thus, there is a shift toward the market-oriented 
majority control acquisitions as a main effect, but the state coalition works against this effect. Again, 
a weak state coalition is an opportunity for the market coalition, especially when high performance 
gives managerial discretion that can be used to pursue acquisitions leading to a controlling ownership 
share (e.g., Hambrick & Finkelstein, 1987). Figure 2 shows the effects using the best-fitting Model 6, 
and is similar to Figure 1 except that the effect sizes are weaker overall, and the interaction effect 
with stateness is so strong that high performance and stateness predict that firms will avoid taking 
higher market orientation such as majority acquisitions. If a high stateness firm makes a market-
oriented acquisition, which is rare, it is even less likely to do so following high profitability. 
=== Insert Table 5 and Figure 2 about here === 
Next we present the analysis of loans in Table 6. Both without and with fixed effects, stateness 
works against the main effect of performance relative to the historical aspiration level, contrary to 
Hypothesis 2. Boards with low stateness avoid state banks when the performance is improving, but 
high stateness cancels this effect. The effects are graphed in Figure 3, using the best-fitting Model 6. 
Performance relative to social aspiration levels cannot be interpreted as indicating firm intentions 
because banks use the profitability compared to other firms to assess the loan risk, making these 
coefficients a mixture of firm and bank decision making. The findings show that firms with high 
stateness do not respond to the performance by changing the source of their loans, suggesting a 
boundary condition on the theory. The dominant coalition is influential in the presence of 
performance feedback on a goal it sees as important. This is why ROA, which is important for board 
members with market experience, affects acquisition choices provided the state experience board 
members do not form a dominant coalition. It is also why ROA has less effect on choosing loans 
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from state owned banks, as the state experience board members who are most interested in such 
loans are less responsive to ROA as a goal.  
=== Insert Table 6 and Figure 3 about here === 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
This study was motivated by the missing follow-up of dominant coalition theory, leading to a 
gap of evidence on coalition building and decision making. Current theory of firm decisions is split 
between a highly realistic but complex view of dominant coalition building in the behavioral theory 
of the firm and the parsimonious but simpler view of upper echelon theory. We propose a middle 
ground that builds on upper echelon theory and adds a model of coalition building that takes into 
account that decision-making groups have multiple experience-based preferences, including neutral 
or ambivalent members who can be recruited as allies when building a coalition. The resulting 
faultlines can be modeled to predict potential coalitions based on member experiences, but features 
of each specific choice could make the realized coalition differ in each decision. To this model of 
coalition building, we add considerations from current research on how organizational decision 
making is triggered by performance relative to the aspiration level. The result is a behavioral theory 
of upper echelon decisions, adding to extant theory of organizational change. 
Our theoretical and empirical contributions address three issues. First, we draw on dominant 
coalition theory and its process of recruiting allies to make theory linking decision-maker experience 
to predictions of the decisions of teams based on the size, commitment, and status of each subgroup. 
Second, we use this theory to develop empirical measures that can be used to identify the potential 
dominant coalition and its preferred outcome. Third, we make upper echelons predictions contingent 
on performance relative to aspiration levels, and thus combine theory on the composition of a 
decision making team with theory on the problem or opportunity that triggers a decision. 
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Theoretically this means that we connect the behavioral theory of the firm with upper echelon theory, 
which lets us examine coalition building and experience based on subgroup size, commitment, and 
status, and from this predict decisions.  
We use the market transition in China to examine how boards of directors act differently 
depending on the firm performance and the proportion of directors with market versus state 
experience, and also taking into account how directors with none or both of these experiences can 
become potential allies recruited by each side. The boards can be characterized precisely by 
considering how coalition formation depends on the proportions of members with allegiance to each 
side, and analysis using factor analysis, faultline, or proportion measures produced consistent results. 
Thus, the general theory can be turned into specific hypotheses on how firms respond to performance 
in ways that match the most prevalent experience. 
The empirical findings show that decision making was strongly affected by the dominant 
coalition of the firm, causing the solution resulting from search to be consistent with its experience. It 
was also highly contingent on the performance relative to aspiration levels. This is a novel finding in 
support of new theory that fills gaps in upper echelon theory and the behavioral theory of the firm. 
The empirical evidence is not just of theoretical interest, it also shows that director experience guides 
very consequential organizational actions. In each step from internal to state-bridged to market-
oriented acquisitions, the board is moving the firm closer to a market orientation in its acquisition 
activities. The choice between a state-bridged and a market-oriented acquisition is important for the 
firm. State-bridged acquisitions have a safety valve because the state may support a firm that gets 
economic difficulties after taking over a weak firm as a rescue operation. They also have limited 
profits because the purpose of taking over such firms is not to restructure for increased efficiency and 
decreased labor use. Market-oriented acquisitions are the opposite. The acquiring firm has free hands 
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in what it can do to profit from the acquisitions, but it is on its own if the acquisition fails.  
There are great opportunities for extending this type of investigation to other experiences and 
behaviors. For example, firms founded on financial, technological, and market considerations will 
have upper echelons with clear affiliation to different organizational units and different education. 
Just as such differences have been shown to influence changes in the selection criteria of CEOs over 
time (e.g., Fligstein, 1990), one can also examine whether top management teams direct the 
organization differently as a result of experience and education steering decision making (Cho & 
Hambrick, 2006; Hambrick, Cho, & Chen, 1996; Nielsen & Nielsen, 2013). There are already 
suggestions that director backgrounds matter for firm choices, such as responses to deregulation (Cho 
& Hambrick, 2006), engagement in corporate social responsibility (Chin, Hambrick, & Treviño, 
2013), initiation of competitive moves (Hambrick et al., 1996), and strategic change (Haynes & 
Hillman, 2010). These have not yet been coupled with coalition building and performance in the way 
done here. A distinct feature of our theory is that the effect of decision-maker experience is 
contingent on the performance relative to aspiration levels, and this has not seen sufficient 
examination. 
This investigation started with an important theoretical gap. The theory of dominant coalitions 
specified coalition building that could be specific to a decision, triggered by a decision-making 
occasion, orchestrated by a decision-making subgroup, and involving recruitment of allies from 
neutral and ambivalent decision makers. This realistic view of decision making has two features that 
are often missing from current research. First, recruitment of allies is rarely considered, so the theory 
of coalition formation and the methodology of measuring potential coalitions fall short of the original 
treatment (Cyert & March, 1963). Second, there is little consideration of how decision-making is 
triggered, such as when performance relative to aspiration levels indicates a problem or an 
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opportunity. We have made progress on examining decision-making occasions through theoretical 
integration with performance feedback theory and its examination of performance relative to the 
aspiration level. We have also made methodological progress through changing the focus from the 
rate of change to the content of change. Analyzing decision choices rather than decision rates is a 
better match of theory and methodology. We have also incorporated more of the dominant coalition 
theory into our hypothesis development through our consideration of how coalitions are built. Along 
with this theoretical progress we have made empirical progress by constructing measures of the 
potential dominant coalition through three different approaches, including one that originates in the 
currently active research on group faultlines.  
The innovations in theory and methodology made here open the door for subsequent 
examination of different decision-making groups, decision-making occasions, forms of experience, 
and dimensions of coalition building. Coalition building is central to decision making at multiple 
organizational levels, and likely more so for decisions that involve high stakes for the decision-
making groups and alternatives that are divisive along some dimension. Such decision making 
deserves additional investigation. Much more work can be done linking decision maker experience 
and decision outcomes, and we can also learn more about the decision making processes. Boards of 
directors could simply discuss a decision until reaching a resolution, but it is likely that an existing 
dominant coalition will also try to exert its influence across decisions through agenda control, 
information release, order of speech, and other procedural interventions. This investigation only 
scratches the surface of the theoretical and empirical progress that can be made by extending the 
theory of coalition formation and improving the methodology for conducting empirical tests.  
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Table 1: Tabulation of Type and Nature of Acquisition  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Cells show number of events and percentage (in parenthesis). Assets only, minority share, and 
majority share are subdivisions of market-oriented acquisitions. 
 
Table 2: Principal Factor Analysis of Boards 
 
Panel 1: Retained Factors 
 
Factor Eigenvalue Difference Proportion Cumulative 
Factor1 0.77905 0.75456 1.4848 1.4848 
Factor2 0.02450 0.05131 0.0467 1.5315 
Factor3 -0.02682 0.22524 -0.0511 1.4804 
Factor4 -0.25206 . -0.4804 1.0000 
Likelihood Ratio test of independent vs. saturated:  chi2(6)  = 0.000; Prob>chi2 = 0.0000 
 
Panel 2: Factor loadings (pattern matrix) and unique variances 
 
Variable Factor1 Factor2 Uniqueness  
Proportion w/market experience -0.6178 0.0112 0.6182 
Proportion w/state experience 0.6082 -0.0301 0.6292 
Proportion w/both experiences 0.0992 0.1042 0.9793 
Proportion w/two state experiences 0.1327 0.1122 0.9698 
  
 
 Nature of Market-oriented Acquisitions 
Type of Acquisition   Asset only   Minority share Majority share 
Internal 11,769 (37.43)    
State-bridged   3,894 (12.38)    
Market-oriented   15,779 (50.18) 3,217 (10.23) 7,298 (23.21) 5,264 (16.74) 
Total 31,442 (100.00)    
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Table 3: Descriptive Statistics and Correlations  𝑎 
 Mean s. d. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 
1. Age 11.79 5.66 1 
       
        
2. Size 21.70 1.46 .10 1 
      
        
3. Market to book 1.90 1.60 -.12 -.34 1 
     
        
4. Debt to equity 2.06 16.63 .02 .04 -.05 1 
    
        
5. Free cash flow  2.00 9.15 .03 .03 -.05 .76 1 
   
        
6. Diversification level 2.21 1.53 .18 .12 -.16 -.00 .01 1           
7. Cumulative asset  5.66 7.19 .30 .24 -.08 .01 .03 .18 1          
8. Cumulative minority  3.56 5.86 .23 .32 -.07 .02 .00 .12 .25 1          
9. Cumulative control  2.97 4.38 .26 .33 -.09 .01 .02 .17 .72 .31 1         
10. Prop. state owner 0.23 0.25 -.24 .14 -.11 .00 .00 -.02 -.16 -.15 -.15 1        
11. Inverse Mills ratio 0.06 0.22 -.02 .11 -.08 -.00 .00 .03 -.02 -.02 -.01 .19 1       
12. Stateness factor 0.16 0.59 .17 .18 -.16 .03 .04 .07 .16 .02 .13 .10 .07 1      
13. Stateness ASW 0.32 0.71 .09 .04 -.11 .02 .01 .02 .03 -.04 .01 .19 .05 .65 1     
14. Stateness proportion 0.23 0.70 .12 .08 -.13 .02 .02 .01 .04 .02 -.01 .21 .06 .68 .77 1    
15. ROA – hist. AL 3.12 9.67 -.06 .10 .18 -.02 -.01 -.02 .03 .03 .03 -.03 -.02 -.02 -.07 -.04 1   
16. ROA – soc. AL -0.73 9.82 -.06 .09 .05 -.01 -.01 .03 -.02 .00 -.02 .04 -.01 -.03 -.04 -.06 .89 1  
 
 
a
 A total of 2,337 firms and 28,847 observations comprise the data
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Table 4: Ordered Logit Model: Type of Acquisition  
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 
Fixed Effects Province Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Fixed Effects Industry Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Fixed Effects Year N N N N Y Y Y 
Age -0.015** -0.012** -0.011** -0.011** -0.021** -0.020** -0.020** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Size 0.125** 0.125** 0.121** 0.122** 0.040** 0.033* 0.035* 
 (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) 
Market to book 0.119** 0.109** 0.109** 0.109** 0.063** 0.062** 0.063** 
 (0.009) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) 
Debt to equity -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Free cash flow  0.002 0.002 0.001 0.002 0.000 -0.000 0.000 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Diversification level -0.012 -0.011 -0.014 -0.012 0.001 -0.001 0.001 
 (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) 
Cum. asset experience  -0.038** -0.037** -0.037** -0.036** -0.039** -0.040** -0.039** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Cum. minority experience 0.030** 0.028** 0.029** 0.029** 0.022** 0.023** 0.024** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Cum. control experience 0.032** 0.032** 0.031** 0.030** 0.021** 0.020** 0.019** 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
Proportion state ownership -0.777** -0.708** -0.686** -0.691** -0.148* -0.154* -0.166** 
 (0.055) (0.056) (0.056) (0.056) (0.061) (0.061) (0.060) 
Inverse Mills ratio -0.032 -0.019 -0.023 -0.035 -0.093 -0.101 -0.113+ 
 (0.064) (0.064) (0.064) (0.064) (0.065) (0.065) (0.065) 
Stateness factor  0.157**   -0.048   
  (0.033)   (0.037)   
Stateness ASW    -0.062*   -0.103**  
   (0.028)   (0.029)  
Stateness proportion    0.003   -0.051+ 
    (0.030)   (0.030) 
ROA- historical AL, <  0.024** 0.038** 0.036** 0.038** 0.003 0.003 0.005 
AL (0.005) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
   X Stateness  -0.031** -0.016* -0.023** -0.012 -0.011 -0.015+ 
  (0.010) (0.008) (0.008) (0.010) (0.008) (0.008) 
ROA- historical AL, >  0.059** 0.080** 0.074** 0.074** 0.044** 0.039** 0.039** 
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AL (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) 
   X Stateness  -0.067** -0.035** -0.041** -0.044** -0.023** -0.029** 
  (0.007) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006) 
ROA- social AL, < AL -0.008 -0.023** -0.019** -0.020** 0.011+ 0.014* 0.013* 
 (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
   X Stateness  0.030** 0.012+ 0.018* 0.012 0.006 0.009 
  (0.008) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.007) (0.007) 
ROA- social AL, > AL -0.062** -0.064** -0.064** -0.067** -0.032** -0.030** -0.034** 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
   X Stateness  0.035** 0.016** 0.023** 0.019* 0.006 0.012+ 
  (0.007) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.006) (0.007) 
        
Log likelihood -26,878.93 -26,797.04 -26,672.87 -26,811.41 -26,400.83 -26,278.75 -26,424.12 
Likelihood ratio test 2582.12** 2745.9** 2994.24** 2717.16** 3538.32** 3782.48** 3491.74** 
Degrees of freedom 128 133 133 133 145 145 145 
+p<.10; *p<.05; **p<.01; two-sided hypothesis tests. Robust standard errors below coefficient estimates. 28,847 observations.  
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Table 5: Ordered Logit Model: Nature of Acquisition  
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 
Fixed Effects Province Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Fixed Effects Industry Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Fixed Effects Year N N N N Y Y Y 
Age 0.005 0.006+ 0.008* 0.008* 0.005 0.006 0.006+ 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
Size 0.036* 0.047* 0.040* 0.042* 0.034+ 0.028 0.030 
 (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) 
Market to book 0.027* 0.034** 0.030* 0.028* 0.073** 0.068** 0.066** 
 (0.012) (0.013) (0.012) (0.013) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) 
Debt to equity 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.009* 0.009* 0.009+ 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
Free cash flow  0.005 0.005 0.005 0.006 -0.004 -0.004 -0.003 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
Diversification level 0.002 -0.004 -0.003 -0.002 0.014 0.014 0.016 
 (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) 
Cum. asset experience  -0.009** -0.008* -0.009** -0.008* -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
Cum. minority experience -0.020** -0.021** -0.021** -0.021** -0.027** -0.026** -0.026** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Cum. control experience 0.033** 0.033** 0.033** 0.031** 0.012+ 0.011+ 0.009 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
Proportion state ownership -0.741** -0.719** -0.675** -0.656** -0.159+ -0.167+ -0.155+ 
 (0.081) (0.081) (0.082) (0.082) (0.089) (0.089) (0.089) 
Inverse Mills ratio -0.186+ -0.181+ -0.183+ -0.199* -0.304** -0.309** -0.324** 
 (0.097) (0.097) (0.097) (0.097) (0.099) (0.099) (0.099) 
Stateness factor  -0.055   -0.156**   
  (0.049)   (0.055)   
Stateness ASW    -0.109**   -0.080+  
   (0.040)   (0.041)  
Stateness proportion    -0.108**   -0.077+ 
    (0.041)   (0.042) 
ROA- historical AL, <  -0.003 -0.004 -0.011 -0.004 -0.002 -0.005 0.001 
AL (0.008) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) 
   X Stateness  0.017 0.025* 0.006 0.025+ 0.019+ 0.001 
  (0.014) (0.011) (0.011) (0.014) (0.011) (0.012) 
ROA- historical AL, >  0.017* 0.012+ 0.019** 0.015* -0.008 0.000 -0.003 
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AL (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) 
   X Stateness  -0.019* -0.026** -0.021** -0.009 -0.020** -0.016* 
  (0.009) (0.007) (0.007) (0.009) (0.007) (0.007) 
ROA- social AL, < AL -0.000 -0.000 0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.008 
 (0.007) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) 
   X Stateness  -0.001 -0.014 0.007 -0.005 -0.008 0.012 
  (0.011) (0.009) (0.009) (0.012) (0.009) (0.009) 
ROA- social AL, > AL -0.021** -0.020** -0.028** -0.023** -0.006 -0.013+ -0.009 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) 
   X Stateness  0.044** 0.042** 0.037** 0.035** 0.035** 0.030** 
  (0.010) (0.008) (0.009) (0.011) (0.008) (0.009) 
        
Log likelihood  -14,337.69 -14,320.17 -14,261.66 -14,307.92 -13,796.04 -13,757.85 -13,797.57 
Likelihood ratio test 982.22** 1017.26** 1134.28** 1041.76** 2065.52** 2141.90** 2062.46** 
Degrees of freedom 127 132 132 132 144 144 144 
+p<.10; *p<.05; **p<.01; two-sided hypothesis tests. Robust standard errors below coefficient estimates. 14,154 observations.  
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Table 6: Logit Model: State-bank Loan 
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 
Fixed Effects Province Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Fixed Effects Industry Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Fixed Effects Year N N N N Y Y Y 
Age -0.009+ -0.006 -0.009+ -0.008+ 0.004 0.005 0.005 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
Size -0.476** -0.456** -0.472** -0.469** -0.316** -0.313** -0.311** 
 (0.026) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.029) (0.029) (0.029) 
Market to book -0.006 -0.002 0.005 0.011 -0.017 -0.016 -0.009 
 (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) 
Debt to equity 0.034** 0.034** 0.035** 0.035** 0.025** 0.025** 0.025** 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
Free cash flow  -0.073** -0.073** -0.074** -0.075** -0.055** -0.056** -0.056** 
 (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) 
Diversification level 0.024 0.011 0.022 0.019 -0.018 -0.015 -0.017 
 (0.016) (0.017) (0.016) (0.016) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) 
Cum. acquisition experience -0.038** -0.035** -0.037** -0.037** -0.021** -0.021** -0.021** 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
Proportion state ownership 1.317** 1.257** 1.265** 1.294** 0.262* 0.232+ 0.278* 
 (0.099) (0.101) (0.102) (0.102) (0.122) (0.123) (0.122) 
Inverse Mills ratio -0.152 -0.138 -0.139 -0.152 -0.167 -0.155 -0.166 
 (0.100) (0.100) (0.100) (0.100) (0.105) (0.105) (0.105) 
Stateness factor  -0.585**   -0.209**   
  (0.070)   (0.079)   
Stateness ASW    -0.221**   -0.117+  
   (0.060)   (0.061)  
Stateness proportion    -0.334**   -0.194** 
    (0.059)   (0.063) 
ROA- historical AL, <  -0.030** -0.055** -0.053** -0.053** -0.007 -0.004 -0.004 
AL (0.011) (0.012) (0.014) (0.014) (0.013) (0.014) (0.014) 
   X Stateness  0.099** 0.047** 0.054** 0.063** 0.040* 0.041* 
  (0.020) (0.018) (0.019) (0.019) (0.017) (0.019) 
ROA- historical AL, >  -0.045** -0.066** -0.067** -0.071** -0.023* -0.023* -0.025* 
AL (0.008) (0.009) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) 
   X Stateness  0.058** 0.041** 0.040** 0.033* 0.028* 0.017 
  (0.015) (0.012) (0.012) (0.016) (0.012) (0.012) 
ROA- social AL, < AL 0.033** 0.061** 0.054** 0.063** 0.017+ 0.009 0.018+ 
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 (0.008) (0.009) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) 
   X Stateness  -0.099** -0.043** -0.067** -0.067** -0.034** -0.055** 
  (0.014) (0.012) (0.012) (0.014) (0.012) (0.012) 
ROA- social AL, > AL 0.050** 0.052** 0.050** 0.050** 0.014 0.011 0.008 
 (0.009) (0.010) (0.011) (0.010) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) 
   X Stateness  -0.013 -0.006 0.006 0.000 0.000 0.024 
  (0.017) (0.014) (0.014) (0.018) (0.014) (0.015) 
        
Likelihood ratio -7,075.88 -7,032.70 -7,020.30 -7,053.60 -6,849.15 -6,810.63 -6,850.43 
Log likelihood test 1810.98** 1897.34** 1830.26** 1763.66** 2264.44** 2249.6** 2170.00** 
Degrees of freedom 44 49 49 49 61 61 61 
+p<.10; *p<.05; **p<.01; two-sided hypothesis tests. Robust standard errors below coefficient estimates. 16,823 observations 
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Figure 1: Probability of Market-oriented Acquisition by Stateness Factor 
 
 
 
The probability is set to 0.5, which equals the full-sample proportion, when ROA equals the aspiration level. 
Low stateness means 10th percentile, and high stateness means 90th percentile.  
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Figure 2: Probability of Majority Ownership Acquisition by Stateness Factor 
 
 
The probability is set to 0.33, which equals the proportion in the sample of market-oriented acquisitions, when 
ROA equals the aspiration level. Low stateness means 10th percentile, and high stateness means 90th percentile. 
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Figure 3: Probability of State Bank Loan by Stateness ASW  
 
The probability is set to 0.18, which equals the proportion in the sample of loans, when ROA equals the 
aspiration level. Low stateness means 10th percentile, and high stateness means 90th percentile. 
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